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Abstract

This paper uses data collected from the National Interbank Funding Center of China,
the People’s Bank of China, the National Bureau of Statistics, and Bloomberg starting
in October 2006 through 2013 to test the economic fundamental’s affecting the
housing market in Shanghai, particularly interest rates. This study finds that the 6month duration Shibor has a negative and significant correlation with house price
growth in Shanghai when lagged 4 months. The analysis continues by examining
other economic fundamentals affecting house price growth, finding growth in
inflation, the money supply and Shanghai real estate investment to have significant,
positive relationships with the housing market in China. GDP and the national state
balance, on the other hand, have negative and significant relationships with house
price growth. The Shanghai stock exchange was found to have no significant impact
on the housing market over the time period. The sample period is limited to 87
observations due to the relatively recent development of Shibor for a benchmark
interest rate.
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I. Introduction
Historically, the reputation of the Chinese government’s control over the
economy has only been surpassed by its control over the Internet. In the years following
the nation’s acceptance into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the government has
made a slow but steady move for financial reform, particularly with regards to the
nation’s real estate market. In 2001, the government continued the privatization of the
country’s housing market, allowing real estate companies to go public. As the provincial
governments became increasingly significant in the real estate supply chain, the
significant increases in house prices that accompanied investment from local government
has been met with substantial, but not necessarily effective regulation.
China’s housing market is currently separated into three distinct
categories; commodity houses, rental properties, and economically affordable properties.
Economically affordable houses have strict requirements for applicants, and once
purchased cannot be sold for five years1. The latter has made these properties
particularly uneconomical for investors as speculators of the housing market, causing
economical properties to only account for 3% of all homes built in 2010, a figure far from
its height of 25% in the late 90s when the government exercised more control over the
market. Speculation on the country’s housing market has led to drastic increases in
commodity houses and rental properties prices; however rental prices have not exhibited
the same growth as the properties themselves. In attempts to deflate a possible bubble in
the housing market, the government has been trying to restrict real estate investor’s
access to funds from banks and State- Owned Enterprises (SOEs). While this has

1
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decreased the amount of direct funding from SOEs into the real estate market, it is
unclear how effective these regulations have been as SOEs have been lending to an
increasing amount of trusts and wealth management products, which tend to invest in the
speculative housing market.
After a governmental tightening of their control over interest rates failed to curb
house price growth, the government has taken steps towards a more free economy, which
is most apparent in the country’s attempts to liberalize interest rates. This freeing of
interest rates began in 2006 with the creation of a benchmark interest rate, the Shanghai
Interbank Offered Rate (Shibor). This was an extremely important step for the
government in adjusting from a highly controlled economy to a more laissez faire
economy run by economic fundamentals rather than national policy. While short-term
interest rates experienced extreme spikes over the summer, the long-term rates have been
much smoother, giving the government confidence in rate liberalization. The HSBC
believes this confidence will soon manifest in the final liberalization of interest rates with
the freeing of deposit rates within the next year or two2.
With the liberalization of interest rates and the amount of wealth concentrated in
China’s real estate market, the economic fundamentals affecting house price growth has
been widely investigated. The goal of this paper is to econometrically determine the
economic fundamentals that affect the housing market in China, especially if interest
rates have influence on house price growth since the inception of Shibor. Previous
research into this subject has determined that the main influences on the housing market
are inflation, the money supply, GDP and growth in Chinese equity prices. Studies that
2
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have investigates the effects interest rates have on the nation’s real estate market
concluded they have no impact on house price growth.
This study will proceed as follows. Section II is a review of academic literature
on the fundamental factors of China’s housing market. Section III describes the data
analyzed and models used to investigate the determinants of house price growth. Section
IV goes on to discuss the results of the tests conducted. Section V will conclude the
study and provide suggestions for further study.

II. Literature Review
The economic fundamental determinants of housing prices in China has been
previously looked at but the conventional wisdom on the subject is in a state of constant
change as the Chinese government continues to liberalize their economy. Burdekin and
Tao (2013) investigate the relationships between the nation’s housing prices and
liquidity, lending activity, stock prices, and inflation, using monthly data from 19992000. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of monthly new M2 to monthly new industrial
production and lending activity is calculated as the ratio of monthly new loans to monthly
new industrial production3. Industrial production is chosen instead of GDP because GDP
is reported quarterly while industrial production, a figure that tends to track GDP with
less smoothing, ensures monthly observations and possibly more accurate figures. They
use the national consumer price index (CPI) to account for inflation, the Shanghai Ashares index as a proxy for stock prices, and include the five-year lending rate to
3

“Industrial production is seasonally adjusted based upon a seasonality index (S.I.) comprised of each
month's gross output divided by the one-year moving average of gross output. Each month's index is the
average of that month's indices throughout the sample. After normalizing the S.I. to a sum of 12, each
month's gross output is then divided by that month's S.I. to obtain the series used in the empirical work”
Burdekin and Tao (2013).
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represent interest rates. Burdekin and Tao reference previous studies (Guo and Li (2011),
Wang and Han (2011), and Zhang, Hua and Zhao (2012)) and states their results might be
negligible as the government-provided national housing price series seems unusually flat,
implying government smoothing of the data series. Shanghai is one of China’s largest,
most mature housing markets, leading them to use Shanghai housing price data to show
the effects on housing markets in China’s major cities. They conduct a Granger causality
test between Shanghai housing prices and each of the other variables, finding that there is
significant bi-directional causality between housing price growth and stock price growth.
The test results also showed that the M2/industrial production and the new
loans/industrial production ratios have significant causality on house price growth but not
the other way around. The lack of reverse causality implies that house price appreciation
in China is not solely caused by aggregate price pressure but instead might have been the
preferential investment channel for the excess liquidity. Housing prices and interest rates
showed no causality either way, and housing prices showed slight causality on inflation.
Burdekin and Tao (2013) went on to conduct a vector autoregressive (VAR) test
to further examine the connections between housing prices, stock prices and the other
macroeconomic variables. The VAR model confirms that stock market growth has a
significant effect on the Shanghai housing market growth, and also shows significant
negative effects of lagged inflation on share price growth, the liquidity ratio, and the new
loan ratio. It is possible that these negative effects are caused by “countercyclical
monetary policy whereby the People’s Bank attempts to tighten money and credit growth
when inflation is on the rise” (Burdekin and Tao (2010), 9). The VAR model also
suggests that the lending rate significantly affects the liquidity ratio, the new loan ratio
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and the national inflation rate while lagged share price growth and its own lagged values
have significant effects on the lending rate. Burdekin and Tao rerun these tests using a
national housing price data series; however, unlike Guo and Li (2011), Burdekin and Tao
(2013) utilize a national data series provided by a private institution4 rather than using the
government-provided national real estate data set as they share Leung’s (2010) distrust of
the Chinese official nationwide house price data. The Granger test results mimicked the
results of the Shanghai housing data series with the exception that there was not a
significant effect of house price growth on either share price growth nor the new loan
ratio. The VAR model similarly paralleled the Shanghai housing data set results,
confirming the earlier test result and adding that the lagged M2 ratio positively and
significantly affects house price growth while the lagged loan ratio negatively and
significantly affects house price growth. This liquidity effect is consistent with Guo and
Li (2011), Wang and Han (2011), Xu and Chen (2012) and Zhang, Hua and Zhao (2012).
Guo and Li (2011) look at excess liquidity and policy changes in China with
respect to housing price booms. They measure excess liquidity as the gap between
excess money growth, represented by M2, and nominal GDP growth (LIQ = ∆M2 ∆NGDP). Rather than purely looking at housing prices they assess the effects of excess
liquidity on housing price booms, which is measured as the difference between the
growth of the real estate price index and the rental price index (HPB = ∆REPI - ∆RPI).
They look at quarterly data from the first quarter of 1998 to the second quarter of 2010,
utilizing national real estate and rental price indices. They conduct a Granger causality
test, which showed that excess liquidity causes housing price booms, but not the other
4

China International Capital Corporation Limited [http://www.cicc.com.cn/CICC/english/index.htm]. The
index includes Beijing, Chendu, Hangzhou, Hefei, Shanghai, Shenzen, Tianjin, Wuhan and Xian
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way around. They are also able to show this through a VAR model, looking at the effects
of a positive shock in excess liquidity on real estate price booms and inflation represented
by the national CPI. The VAR model suggests a positive shock to excess liquidity leads
to a significant rise in housing price booms, even more so than consumer prices as the
effect on CPI was insignificant.
Wang and Wang (2013) focus on the effects that the money supply, interest rate,
RMB exchange rate and GDP have on housing price growth. Unlike previous studies
(Burdekin and Tao (2013), Guo and Li (2011)), this study uses M1 to represent the
money supply instead of M2 but offers no explanation as to why they feel M1 is a more
accurate representation. They use the real effective RMB exchange rate, the 7-day
Shibor as the interest rate, and a combination of quarterly GDP data using industrial
added value growth year-over-year (YoY) as a proxy for GDP growth in the intermittent
monthly periods. Industrial growth as a GDP proxy to ensure monthly data is consistent
with Burdekin and Tao (2013). All data is monthly from December 2005 through August
2012 and are taken the logarithm to avoid a unit root error. Wang and Wang (2013) first
run a regression to confirm these four macroeconomic variables are significant, and the
regression suggests the 7-day Shibor is an insignificant factor in determining housing
prices, leading them to drop interest rates as a variable in their further tests. They go on to
conduct a Granger causality test revealing a negative and significant relationship between
GDP and housing prices, that real estate prices negatively and significantly impact the
real effective RMB exchange rate and that M1 and real estate prices have a positive and
significant correlation. While the relationship between GDP and housing prices seems
counterintuitive, they offer the explanation that rising house prices will increase

6

homeowners wealth, causing them to increase spending thereby increasing GDP, but this
is offset by the increase in people’s desires to own real estate (housing market demand),
furthering savings and decreasing GDP.
Marie-Theres Stohldreier (2012) examines the macroeconomic determinants of
housing prices in Chinese cities, looking specifically at the population growth rate, stock
market growth rate, inflation, GDP, geographical locations, savings, investment in fixed
assets, construction activity, and the unemployment rate. All data was collected from the
government-provided national data on an annual basis starting in 1998 through 2011.
The national CPI represents inflation, the share price growth is reflected through a
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) index and construction activity growth is captured by
the growth in the amount of total completed floor space of 10,000 square meters. She
conducts an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which all macroeconomic
variables were regressed individually against housing price growth. The results of all the
variables were significant over the series with the exception of savings, possibly refuting
Wang and Wang’s (2013) notions that house price growth would have a positive
correlation with savings and the reason for the negative relationship between GDP and
the housing market. The population growth rate and stock market growth rate were
shown to have significantly negative impacts on real estate market growth rate, the latter
confirming Burdekin and Tao (2013) that the Chinese real estate and stock markets are
competing investment channels. The national CPI, GDP, geographical location,
investment in fixed assets, construction activity growth, and the unemployment rate all
showed positive significant effects on house price growth. Stohldreier (2012)
acknowledges that the positive correlations seen in construction activity and investments
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in fixed assets intuitively would be negative as they would increase supply in the housing
market and speculation may have been the driving factor in house price growth
overshadowing the increase in supply.
Contrary to the studies above, Yu (2010) found that there is no consistent
relationship between housing prices and economic fundamentals because of the Chinese
government exercising direct influence on the housing market. Yu in particular points to
the “Provision for the Transferring State-owned Land by Bids, Auction or Listing”5,
which prohibited the sale of land through closed-door negotiations as well as the transfer
of land-use rights. This leaves landowners with the option of either selling land-use
rights through public bids, auction or listing, or by allowing the Chinese government to
repurchase the land at a relatively low price. Yu believes this policy causes housing
prices to be inflated as it greatly restricts the land supply. Yu analyzes the relationship of
economic fundamentals and China’s housing prices by regressing population, real interest
rate, per capita disposable income, and housing density as economic factors on real estate
over three time periods 1998-2001, 2002-2006, and the all encompassing 1998-2006. Yu
chooses to break the data series into the periods before and after the Chinese government
instituted their land-use policy in 2002 to see if the policy changed the real estate market
in China and determines this macro-control has created a new real estate market. Over
the entire time period the regression found that population growth, per capita disposable
income, and the real interest rate positively and significantly affects housing prices.
However, this significance is not reflected through the sub-periods as variables that
weren’t significant in the complete sample were very significant in a sub-period and

5
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variables that were significant in the complete sample did not show significance in the
sub-periods. One of these variables is the interest rate, which was significant in the first
sub-period and over the total data set, but not in the second sub-period leading Yu to state
the real interest rate has been rendered insignificant in the current housing market by the
land-use policy.

III. Data Section
Shibor
The Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate represents the wholesale interest rates
calculated by averaging all interbank RMB lending rates as quoted by 18 banks at 11:30
A.M. each business day, excluding the 4 highest and 4 lowest quotations6. Shibor
durations consist of the overnight, 1-week, 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1
year. The National Interbank Funding Center is responsible for calculating and
publishing Shibor (current quotes available at www.shibor.org). The Shibor Working
Group is in charge of adjusting the panel banks, supervising and administering Shibor,
and regulating the behavior of the quoted banks in accordance with the Implementation
Rules of Shibor7. As Shibor was originally incepted to provide a benchmark for
derivative products as China pushed for more interest rate liberalization, banks are not
required to trade at their reported rates possibly offering an opportunity for interest rate
manipulation89. To avoid issues experienced with the manipulation of Libor (which the

6

Report both borrowing and lending rates www.shibor.org
Shibor.org
8
Reforming China’s Monetary Policy Framework to Meet Domestic Objectives (Conway, Herd, Chalaux)
9
In January 2008, an interest rate swap market based off of SHIBOR was introduced; “However, turnover
in this market has remained very limited and by September 2010 transactions in the interbank swap market
7
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model for Shibor was based off of) the PBoC has increased rewards for banks that offer
more reliable quotes and instituted harsher penalties for those that do not, while requiring
all price quotes to be evaluated by a third party. This regulation has led Shibor to become
one of the premiere benchmark rates in China (Wen Bin, 2004), and is used as a reference
for setting interest rates on financial products, including interbank deposits, bonds, wealth
management products and derivatives10. Shibor was first calculated October 8, 2006,
making my first monthly data point October 31, 2006 for all variables and extending
through 2013. Shibor data for all maturities was collected from Bloomberg, which
sourced the National Interbank Funding Center.
Kuang (2010) looked at interest rates from 1996-2007, ending right around the
inception of Shibor, and discovered they have a positive effect on the housing market
while the analysis of Yu and Chen (2009) suggested a negative correlation between the
real interest rate and housing prices. Kuang and Yu were unable to utilize Shibor for
their interest rates, so Wang and Wang (2013) decided to use the 1-week Shibor monthly
data series. They used a Grainger test and determined that the 1-week Shibor was not a
significant factor on real estate prices. This study will look into the other Shibor
durations for significance as well as a lag between interest rates and housing prices,
offering greater insight into interest rates’ effects on housing prices as the government
continues to liberalize rates. The study expects to find a negative relationship between
house price growth and interest rates if any significant correlation is found over the time
period. The basic regression to determine which Shibor maturity has the greatest effect
on the Shanghai housing market is as follows:
were only 1.4% of the transactions in the cash and secured interbank bank market” (Conway, Herd,
Chalaux).
10
http://english.caixin.com/2012-10-15/100447412.html
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Ln(Growth_of_Shanghai_Second_Hand_Housing_PI = αi +
β1Ln(Shibor_duration(i))

for 0 < i < 7

Housing Market
The Second-Hand Housing Sales Price Index of Shanghai was used since
variables effecting Shanghai’s housing market are likely to affect China’s other major
cities’ housing markets. The use of Shanghai’s housing data is consistent with previous
studies (Burdekin and Tao (2013)) as the national housing price series provided by the
government is dubiously flat, possibly implying some manipulation of the data by the
government. Shanghai is “the largest and most important housing market in China”
(Burdekin and Tao (2013), 3). I used the Second-Hand Housing PI for Shanghai rather
than the New-Housing PI as the Shanghai housing market is a mature market with most
activity being in the Second-Hand market rather than being fueled by the construction of
new homes and buildings and more accurately reflects what the population is paying. All
housing market data was collected from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics off of
their website (data.stats.gov.cn) from their 70 cities housing sales price index. The
National Bureau of Statistics used to publish only 35 housing price indices along with a
national composite but discontinued this in 2011. When they switched to using 70 cities,
they stopped publishing a national composite as well as used a different methodology for
data collection, which unfortunately might cause some discrepancy within the Shanghai
Second-Hand Housing PI even though Shanghai was one of the original 35 cities
surveyed11. Contrary to the housing price data series in this study, Wang and Wang

11
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(2013) used the national composite up until 2011 then switched to an average of all 70
cities’ real estate price indices.
All data was collected monthly starting October 31, 2006 extending through
December 31, 2013, and was either downloaded as or converted to a growth rate then
taken the natural logarithm. This is done in order to rid the data series of a unit root
error, and the use of the natural log of all variables is consistent with Wang and Wang
(2013). The study then used the following basic regression:
Ln(Growth_of_Second_Hand_Housing_PI) = αi + β1Ln(SHCOMP_Return) +
β2Ln(Growth_of_CPI_YoY) + β3Ln(Growth_of_M2_YoY) +
β4Ln(Growth_of_State_Balance) +
β5Ln(Growth_of_Shanghai_Real_Estate_Investment) + β6Ln(Growth_Shibor) +
β7Ln(Cumulative_Growth_of_Industrial_Added_Value)
This basic regression is then run at lagged time intervals, looking at the independent
variables from time T-i for i=0 through i=6 to see if there is a delay in the effects of these
macroeconomic fundamentals on the Shanghai housing market.
The Shanghai Composite (SHCOMP), developed in December 1990, is a
capitalization-weighted index that tracks the performance of all A-shares and B-shares12
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange13. This was used as a benchmark for the
performance of Chinese equities, and is consistent with previous studies (Burdekin 2013,
Xu and Chen 2012). Burdekin (2013) is able to confirm the findings of Xu and Chen
(2012) that there exists a positive correlation between Chinese stock market gains and
home prices. Zhang and Fung (2006, pp. 31-32) instead discovered that there is a
negative correlation between the Chinese housing and equity markets, theorizing, “that

12
13

Contains 1000 securities
Bloomberg
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stocks and real estate are competing investment channels.”14 It is possible that the
opposing findings of these studies are due to a change in the economic environment
where households move funds from savings into real estate and equities. Burdekin and
Redfern (2009) suggest this might be the case as they looked at participation rates in the
nation’s stock markets and saw a great increase in 2007. This study should be able to
offer more insight into whether or not this is the case as the earliest data point is October
31, 2006, and the study expects to yield similar results to these previous studies.
The national CPI YoY growth is used as a proxy for inflation. The study uses the
YoY growth rate to account for seasonality in price changes. The use of CPI YoY as an
inflation proxy is consistent with Burdekin and Tao (2013) where they find a causal
effect of growth in housing prices on overall consumer price inflation. The M2 YoY
growth rate is used as a proxy for changes in the overall money supply, and use YoY in
order to account for seasonality experienced with M2. The use of M2 is consistent with
Li and Wang (2011) in which they showed the M2 money supply to be a major factor
affecting housing prices and was reconfirmed by Gao and Wang (2009), which looked
from 2000-2007 and findings suggested the money supply had an impact on real estate
price. Han and Wang (2011), in contrast, found there to be little or no effect of changes
in the money supply on housing prices, while Wang and Wang (2013) used M1 for their
money supply. This study expects to confirm the previous results that inflation and
money supply have positive correlations with house price growth.
The growth of the state balance is the growth of the national state revenues minus
the state financial expenditures. Central government state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
14

Zhang and Fung (2006) used data from 1997-2005 and were able to confirm their results with both the
Shanghai housing price index and national housing price index
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invest primarily in real estate and have possibly been overbidding in land auctions
contributing to a real estate bubble in China15; therefore, the state’s liquidity may be an
important factor on housing prices. The data was collected from the Chinese National
Bureau of Statistics.
Shanghai real estate investment growth is the cumulative growth rate of the
amount of money being invested in real estate in Shanghai as reported by the National
Bureau of Statistics. The cumulative growth of industrial added value is the national
increase in industrial production adjusted for seasonality, which serves as a proxy for
GDP since national GDP data is reported quarterly instead of monthly and is consistent
with Burdekin and Tao (2013). Luo and Hong (2012) are able to show bi-directional
Granger causality between real estate prices and GDP, while Hu, Jin, and Chen (2011)
suggest a negative relationship between GDP and real estate prices.

IV. Results and Analysis
The study begins by looking at how different Shibor maturities impact the
Chinese housing market and attempts to determine which duration most significantly
affects house price growth. Table 2 shows the regression outputs of each duration of
Shibor on house price growth, revealing none to be statistically significant. The more
unexpected revelation from the regressions was the positive coefficients for all Shibor
maturities with the exception of the overnight rate. This lack of a significant correlation
between interest rates is consistent with both Burdekin and Tao (2013) and Wang and
Wang (2013)16; however, with the 3-month and 6-month Shibor durations yielding the
15
16

Burdekin 13, 3
The 7-day SHIBOR maturity yielded a p-value of .7013
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only positive adjusted R-squareds and the 6-month maturity having the most significant
coefficient17, it seemed that the 6-month maturity required further analysis.
The study goes on to regress the macroeconomic variables on the Shanghai
housing market, shown in Table 3. The national CPI and M2 money supply YoY growth
both positively and significantly affect house price growth, with M2 having the
coefficient with the greatest magnitude and significance, confirming previous studies
Burdekin and Tao (2013), Wang and Wang (2013) and Stohldreier (2012). The national
state balance has a negative and significant relationship with the house price growth,
which is in accordance with this study’s view that an increase in the state balance would
increase the housing supply as SOEs continue to be a main investment channel for the
housing market, lowering house prices. Another unexpected result was the positive and
significant correlation between Shanghai real estate investment and Shanghai house price
growth, paralleling Stohldreier’s (2012) discovery of a positive correlation between the
housing market and investment in fixed assets as well as construction activity. This
reaffirms her notion that speculation on the Chinese housing market might be driving
price more than fundamentals as house prices show to grow with supply.
The stock market, industrial growth and the interest rate were shown to be
insignificant. The extreme insignificance of the stock market and GDP18 on the housing
market is particularly shocking given the previous significant findings from Burdekin and
Tao (2013), Wang and Wang (2013) and Stohldreier (2012). This is more in line with
Yu’s (2010) hypothesis that macroeconomic fundamentals do not have consistent
relationships with house price growth but rather have are effective only in certain periods,
17
18

P-value = 0.1994
SHCOMP p-value = .8441 and Industrial Added Value p-value = .4815
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suggesting these factors are not relevant given the macroeconomic environment observed
from 2007 through 2013. Although the 6-month Shibor maturity was insignificant, the
negative impact agrees with the initial hypothesis and since it was substantially more
significant than GDP and the Shanghai Composite Index I reran the regression leaving
out the latter two variables. This new regression (Table 3: II) confirmed the results of the
first regression, both in sign of the coefficients and level of significance, including the
insignificance of the 6-month duration Shibor. The study goes on to test the regression
with only the significant variables, confirming the two previous regression results with
Shanghai real estate investment jumping into the 95% level of significance from the 90%
level. Unexpectedly, the R-squared is less so in the third regression than the second
regression suggesting that interest rates may in fact influence the housing market. The
study then runs an auto-regression of the Shanghai housing price index on itself,
revealing that the previously announced housing prices19 are extremely significant and
positively effect the house price growth, which is consistent with Wang and Wang (2013)
and might be further evidence of Stohldreier’s (2012) assumption that speculation is
currently playing a major role in the Chinese housing market.
Real estate, by nature, is a relatively illiquid market with a long-term20 investment
horizon making it important to consider that these macroeconomic variables might have a
lagged impact on house price growth. Since the initial Shibor regression results suggest
the 6-month duration Shibor is the most relevant interest rate, this study chooses to look
at lags up to 6 months to look at the complete credit cycle to maturity. The initial 3
months of lags already showed a lag effect within a few variables as seen in Table 4. The
19
20

Independent variable SHPI (T-1)
US capital gains tax law defines long-term as a holding period greater than one year
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initial lag (T-1) showed that lagged CPI and M2 growths have positive and significant
impacts on house price growth in Shanghai. Moving through the table to lags T-2 and T3, the national CPI continues to get more and more significant, increasing from the 95%
level of significance up to the 99% level, peaking at lag T-3. Cumulative industrial
growth experiences a similar trend, going from an extremely insignificant relationship at
time T to significance at the 90% level showing a negative correlation between the GDP
proxy and the housing market21. This negative relationship agrees with Wang and
Wang’s (2013) results, and while house price appreciation might lead people to increase
savings and reduce GDP but rather an effect of China’s economic shift from a
production-based economy to a consumption-based economy, thereby reducing industrial
growth. The money supply proves to have a highly positive relationship that is consistent
through almost every lag period, maximizing significance in the first lag period with a pvalue of 3.36E-5. The money supply having a positive correlation is in agreement with
the study’s hypothesis that the money supply would mimic the results of previous studies
(Burdekin and Tao (2013), Guo and Li (2011), Wang and Wang (2013) and Stohldreier
(2012)).
Shanghai real estate investment growth seems to share these positive lagged
effects; however, upon further examination this is revealed to not be the case once one
removes the insignificant variables from the regression22. Shanghai real estate is one of
only two variables to consistently exhibit no significant lagged effects on the housing

21

p-value = .4815 at time T compared to p = .0801 at time T-3
The first 2 regressions at LAG T-1 showed a positive and significant correlation between Shanghai real
estate investment and house price growth, once all variables were removed in the third regression it pushed
the variable to insignificance (p-value = .1035).
22
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market within 6 months23. The other of these variables, much to the study’s surprise, is
the SHCOMP, making it the only variable insignificant throughout all the regressions run
in this study. Given Burdekin and Tao’s (2013) confirmation of Stohldreir’s (2012)
finding that the stock market negatively and significantly influences housing prices, this
study expected the index to yield similar results. Instead this study’s results of the stock
market over the 2007-2013 period to have no significant real-time nor lagged impact on
the Chinese housing market is more consistent with Yu’s (2012) hypothesis that
fundamentals have periodic effects on the housing market suggesting current
macroeconomic conditions or government policy may have caused this.
The national state balance yielded unusual results throughout the lagged effects.
The state balance continues to have a negative and significant relationship with house
price growth at the 95% significance level in the lag series T-1. The variable loses all
significance with its p-value soaring to 0.9889 by lag T-4 before it swiftly returns to the
95% level of significance at T-624. The relationship at the 6-month lag is now
significantly positive contrary to the results at time T, which agrees with the earlier
notion that these excess funds flow back into the real estate market through SOEs and
take 6-months to create value.
The most interesting finding from the lagged series is the newfound significance
of interest rates, which is not seen in any of the previous studies (Burdekin and Tao
(2013) and Wang and Wang (2013)). The 6-month duration Shibor first proclaims
significance at lag T-1, where the interest rate imposes a negative influence on house
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Lag T-4 through T-6 results available in Table 5
p-value = .03
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price growth right at the 95% significance level25. This is the first significant correlation
between interest rates and the housing market, showing interest rates are a fundamental
factor of house price growth at least in the observed time period. The negative
relationship between interest rates and the housing market is in line with the study’s
hypothesis that increasing interest rates should increase one’s cost of capital, making it
harder to obtain and therefore driving down house price growth. The 6-month Shibor
maturity continues to increase in significance as the time lag gets closer to the duration
date, peaking at lag T-4 within the 99% confidence level as seen in Table 526.
The study conducts its final regressions, first using a combined regression of the
most significant coefficient of each variable based on its lag period then continuing to run
each variable individually against house price growth. The combined regression yielded
the greatest adjusted R-squared within this study27, suggesting its model and variables
best explain changes in house prices. The Shanghai Composite Index did not yield any
significant coefficients and was therefore excluded from these regressions. Table 6 uses
the state balance with no lag; the Shanghai real estate investment with no lag; the M2
with the 1-month lag; the CPI with the 3-month lag; the industrial growth with the 3month lag and the 6-month duration Shibor at the 4-month lag. The 3-month lagged
national CPI positively and significantly affected the housing market at the 95%
significance level, consistent with the study’s earlier expectations and results, but when it
was then individually regressed against house price growth the CPI dropped out of
significance with the p-value increasing to 0.3495 and the adjusted R-squared yields -

25

p-value = .0507
p-value = .0007 at T-4 versus p-value = .0009 at T-6
27
not including the auto-regression of house price growth at a lag of 1-month to current house price
growth, which yielded an adjusted R-squared of .77
26
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0.0009. The industrial added value growth follows a similar trend, having a negative
impact on the housing market at a significance level within 95% as was the case in earlier
regressions. When the GDP proxy is then individually regressed against house price
growth, however, its p-value substantially rises to 0.4672 from the 0.03 value
experienced in the combined regression as well as exhibiting a negative adjusted Rsquared in the individual regression. The negative adjusted R-squared resulting from
both the national CPI and industrial growth regressions suggest that these variables
themselves may not have significant relationships with the housing market but instead
these variables might be capturing some other factor of house price growth.
The 1-month lagged money supply continues to have an extremely positive
impact on the housing market28 and is significant within the 99%, consistent with the
study’s expectations and findings in previous regressions. M2 is then regressed
individually against house price growth, raising its p-value substantially but still shows a
positive relationship with the housing market and remains significant at the 90% level29.
The national state balance shows to have a negative correlation with house price growth
at the 95% significance level, and this relationship is confirmed by its individual
regression results of a nearly identical coefficient with greater significance30. Shanghai
real estate investment continues its counterintuitive positive relationship with the housing
market and is reaffirmed by its individual regression having nearly identical coefficients
and p-values. The 4-month lagged 6-month Shibor maturity again showed a negative
correlation with the Shanghai housing market that is significant within the 95% level,

28

Coefficient = 3.02
P-value = 1.43E-5 combined, p-value = .0585 individually
30
P-value = 0.022 combined, p-value = .0035 individually
29
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confirming the study’s earlier intuition that interest rates are fundamental to the housing
market. This relationship is supported by the individual regression of the 6-month
duration Shibor on house price growth, with the coefficient and p-value essentially
equaling the values from the combined regression3132.

V. Conclusion
The results of this study confirm the original hypothesis that interest rates are a
significant economic factor in determining housing prices in China, exhibiting a negative
correlation between the two. While more immediate interest rate durations have proven
to have insignificant impacts on the housing market, the 6-month Shibor maturity shows
to be highly significant when lagged 4 months behind housing prices. This lagged affect
confirms the study’s suspicion that since the real estate market is generally an illiquid and
a long-term investment, immediate changes in short duration interest rates shouldn’t have
any affect on house prices while long duration rates will. Inflation growth in China
continued to have a positive and significant impact over multiple lag durations but is
most effective when lagged 3 months behind housing prices. Again, the study expected
that it would take time for these economic fundamentals to trickle through the Chinese
economy into housing prices, with the only variables showing greater significance are the
national state balance and the government-reported Shanghai real estate investment. As
SOEs are major players in the Chinese real estate market, increases in the national
balance could signal to investors an increase in investment and therefore supply to the
housing market, causing investors to bid down prices in anticipation of the supply
31
32

Coefficient combined = -0.1497, individual = -0.1452
P-value combined = 0.013, individual = 0.016
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increase. Contrarily, increases in Shanghai real estate investment are related to increases
in housing prices, but housing prices might be the cause for increases in investment as
higher housing prices increases speculation on the market leading to more investments in
the Chinese housing market. While the Shanghai stock market showed to have no
significant influence on the housing market, further study is needed to show if this is a
result of the specific sample period or if the two truly are competing investment channels.
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Table&1:&&Summary&Statistics&
&&

&&
SHCOMP'
&&

&&
Mean&
Standard&Error&
Median&
Mode&
Standard&Deviation&
Sample&Variance&
Kurtosis&
Skewness&
Range&
Minimum&
Maximum&
Sum&
Count&
&&
&&
&&

0.006693278&
0.010150537&
0.007937205&
#N/A&
0.094677904&
0.008963906&
0.695297974&
J0.223429678&
0.520783739&
J0.246317003&
0.274466736&
0.582315223&
87&
&&
&&
&&

Shanghai'Real'Estate'Investment'
&&
&&
Mean&
0.117982759&
Standard&Error&
0.011620182&
Median&
0.093&
Mode&
0.077&
Standard&Deviation&
0.108385843&
Sample&Variance&
0.011747491&
Kurtosis&
J0.163150048&
Skewness&
0.82133683&
Range&
0.452&
Minimum&
J0.063&
Maximum&
0.389&
Sum&
10.2645&
Count&
87&

&&
&& &&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&

CPI'YoY'
&&

&&
Mean&
Standard&Error&
Median&
Mode&
Standard&Deviation&
Sample&Variance&
Kurtosis&
Skewness&
Range&
Minimum&
Maximum&
Sum&
Count&

&& &&
&& &&
&& &&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&

&&
&&

0.033816092&
0.002619123&
0.031&
0.027&
0.024429552&
0.000596803&
J0.130936996&
J0.086516004&
0.105&
J0.018&
0.087&
2.942&
87&
&&
&&
&&

National'Real'Estate'Sales'Growth'%'
&&
&&
Mean&
0.1315&
Standard&Error&
0.019233232&
Median&
0.122&
Mode&
0.371&
Standard&Deviation&
0.179395642&
Sample&Variance&
0.032182797&
Kurtosis&
J0.719671995&
Skewness&
0.154607288&
Range&
0.727&
Minimum&
J0.197&
Maximum&
0.53&
Sum&
11.4405&
Count&
87&
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&&

&&

&&

&&

&&
Mean&
Standard&Error&
Median&
Mode&
Standard&Deviation&
Sample&Variance&
Kurtosis&
Skewness&
Range&
Minimum&
Maximum&
Sum&
Count&

&&
0.178005747&
0.004910847&
0.1674&
0.185&
0.04580533&
0.002098128&
0.952379362&
1.341674601&
0.1734&
0.124&
0.2974&
15.4865&
87&

&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&

State'Balance'
&&
&&
Mean&
J0.020264368&
Standard&Error&
0.019311438&
Median&
0.003&
Mode&
J0.008&
Standard&Deviation&
0.180125099&
Sample&Variance&
0.032445051&
Kurtosis&
2.171634841&
Skewness&
J0.267520351&
Range&
1.065&
Minimum&
J0.521&
Maximum&
0.544&
Sum&
J1.763&
Count&
87&

&&
&&
&&

&&
&&
&&

&&
&&
&&

&&
&&
&&

M2'YoY'

&&

&&
&&
&&

SecondAHand'Housing'Sales'PI'YoY'
&&
&&
Mean&
0.042206897&
Standard&Error&
0.005117782&
Median&
0.033&
Mode&
J0.015&
Standard&Deviation&
0.047735497&
Sample&Variance&
0.002278678&
J
Kurtosis&
1.157668587&
Skewness&
0.468769714&
Range&
0.161&
Minimum&
J0.022&
Maximum&
0.139&
Sum&
3.672&
Count&
87&

&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&

&&
Mean&
Standard&Error&
Median&
Mode&
Standard&Deviation&
Sample&Variance&

&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&
&&

Kurtosis&
Skewness&
Range&
Minimum&
Maximum&
Sum&
Count&

&&

&&

&&

&&

6M'
&&
0.009717512&
0.007732429&
0.005472996&
0&
0.072123295&
0.00520177&
8.487556178&
J1.737590155&
0.482001999&
J0.309136939&
0.17286506&
0.845423518&
87&
&&
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Table&2:&&SHIBOR&Durations&Regressed&on&Shanghai&House&Price&Growth&
VAR&

1&W&

I&
II&
(0.02072)&&&&&&&&&&
(0.8629)&
&&
0.042202&&&
&&
(0.701342)&

1&M&

&&

&&

3&M&

&&

&&

&&
&&
0.03059&&&&&
(0.750227)& &&
(.07265)&&&&&&
&&
(0.295741)&

6&M&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&
.0.0725&&&&&
(0.199476)&

1&Y&
Observations&
Adjusted&RJ
squared&
&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

O/N&

*PAvalue'in'Parentheses'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'

&&

III&

IV&

V&

VI&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&
&&

87&

87&

87&

87&

J0.01141&

J0.01001&

J0.01055&

0.001241&

&&
(.02876)&&&&
(0.545764)&
87&
87&

0.007755&

J0.0074&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&
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Table&3:&Macroeconomic&Fundamentals&on&Shanghai&House&Price&
Growth&
&&
VAR&

No&Lag&
I&
0.024124&&&
(.844145)&

&&
II&

&&
III&

&&
IV&

&&

&&

&&

M2&YoY&

0.797514**&&&
(.010076)&
2.75423***&&&
(7.67EJ5)&

0.676144**&&&
(0.007821)&
2.72519***&&&
(7.28EJ5)&

0.602465**&&&
(0.016085)&
2.55007***&&&
(0.000169)&

State&Balance&

J0.287559**&&&&
(0.012888)&

J0.303008**&&&
(0.007046)&

J0.338292**&&&
(0.002403)&

&&

Shanghai&Real&Estate&Investment&

0.251112*&&&
(0.051828)&

0.22382*&&&
(0.054301)&

0.24421**&&&
(0.036336)&

&&

J0.080604&&&
(0.15242)&
J0.077467&&&
(0.481495)&

J0.084093&&&
(0.130617)&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

SHCOMP&
CPI&YoY&

6M&
Industrial&Added&Value&
SHPI&Lag&TJ1&
Observations&
Adjusted&RJsquared&
&&

87&
0.233219&
&&

87&
0.24711&
&&

&&

&&
&&

&&
0.869122***&&&
(6.49EJ29)&
87&
87&
0.234878&
0.77197204&
&&

Note:'PAvalue'in'Parentheses.'*'Denotes'90%'confidence,'**'denotes'95%'confidence,'***denotes'99%'confidence'
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Table&4:&&Lagged&Effects&of&Macroeconomic&Fundamentals&on&Shanghai&House&Price&Growth&
&&
VAR&
SHCOMP&
CPI&YoY&
M2&YoY&
State&Balance&
Shanghai&Real&Estate&
Investment&
6M&
Industrial&Added&Value&
Observations&
Adjusted&R@squared&
&&

LAG&T@1&
I&
0.042943&&&
(0.726404)&
0.868182**&&
(0.006093)&
2.926694***&&&
(3.36E@5)&
@0.202083*&&&
(0.087269)&
0.236018*&&&&
(0.068466)&
@0.120374**&&&
(0.044531)&
@0.130643&&&
(0.237832)&
86&
0.213498&
&&

&&
II&

&&
III&

&&
0.872514**&&
(0.00507)&
2.91389***&&&&
(2.74E@5)&
@0.20729*&&&
(0.072125)&
0.219338*&&&
(0.064274)&
@0.10682*&&
(0.062019)&
@0.13189&&&
(0.225116)&
86&
0.23186&
&&

&&
0.665689**&&&
(0.009843)&
2.850909***&&
(3.87E@5)&
@0.236138**&&&
(0.037449)&
0.188558&&&
(0.103502)&
@0.11196**&&&
(0.050749)&
&&
86&
0.227109&
&&

LAG&T@2&
I&
0.025822&&&&&&&&
(0.83266)&
0.884505**&&&
(0.005298)&
2.88543***&&&
(4.01E@5)&
@0.123606&&&
(0.296761)&
0.179356&&&
(0.162851)&
@0.162152**&&
(0.007564)&
@0.170849&&&
(0.122775)&
85&
0.202406&
&&

Note:&P(value&in&Parentheses.&*&denotes&90%&confidence,&**&denotes&95%&confidence,&***denotes&99%&confidence&

&&
II&

&&
III&

&&
IV&

&&
1.04997***&&&
(0.000213)&
2.70942***&&&
(5.98E@5)&

&&
0.985241***&&&
(0.000454)&
2.57552***&&&
(0.000123)&

&&
0.766798**&&&
(0.00144&)&
2.46982***&&&
(0.000228)&

&&
0.178159&&&
(0.129297)&
@0.159596**&&&
(0.005154)&
0.195015*&&&
(0.067993)&
85&
0.216732&
&&
&&

&&

&&

&&
@0.173399**&&&
(0.002353)&
@0.162943&&&
(0.121683)&
85&
0.203516&
&&
&&

&&
@0.181945**&&&
(0.00153)&
&&
85&
0.189286&
&&
&&
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Table&5:&&Lagged&Effects&of&Macroeconomic&Fundamentals&on&Shanghai&
House&Price&Growth&(Continued)&
&&
VAR&
SHCOMP&
CPI&YoY&
M2&YoY&
State&Balance&
Shanghai&Real&Estate&
Investment&
6M&
Industrial&Added&Value&
Observations&
Adjusted&R@squared&
&&

LAG&T@3&
I&
0.081516&&&
(0.499726)&
0.877872**&&&&
(0.004832)&
2.76419***&&&
(6.09E@5)&
@0.062631&&
(0.587491)&
0.109482&&&
(0.383077)&
@0.177833**&&&
(0.003593)&
@0.185394*&&&
(0.088091)&
84&
0.205852&
&&

&&
II&

LAG&T@4&
I&
0.111356&&&
&&
(.347729)&
0.913139***&&&
0.660792**&&&
(0.000833)&
(0.030299)&
2.6498***&&&&&
2.44478***&&&
(5.6E@5)&
(0.000262)&
@0.001618&&&
&&
(0.988987)&
0.083142&&&
&&
(0.499004)&
@0.192245**&&&
@0.186592**&&&
(0.001039)&
(0.002227)&
@0.18022*&&&
@0.156202&&&
(0.080093)&
(0.142515)&
84&
83&
0.223363&
0.176896&
&&
&&

&&
II&
&&
0.43962*&&&
(0.050661)&
2.3507***&&&
(0.000239)&
&&
&&
@0.199608***&&&
(0.000763)&
&&
83&
0.186018&
&&

Note:&P(value&in&Parentheses.&*&Denotes&90%&confidence,&**&denotes&95%&confidence,&***denotes&99%&confidence&

31

Table&6:&&Lagged&Effects&of&Macroeconomic&Fundamentals&on&Shanghai&House&Price&
Growth&(Continued)&
&&
VAR&
SHCOMP&
CPI&YoY&
M2&YoY&
State&Balance&
Shanghai&Real&Estate&
Investment&
6M&
Industrial&Added&Value&
Observations&
Adjusted&R@squared&
&&

LAG&T@5&
I&
0.029842&&&
(0.797277)&
0.464453&&&
(.121754)&
2.04803**&&&
(0.001616)&
0.090884&&&
(0.441951)&
0.075946&&&
(0.529298)&
@0.166208**&&&
(0.006815)&
@0.146785&&&
(0.160952)&
82&
0.137153&
&&

&&
II&

LAG&T@6&
I&
0.101143&&&
&&
(0.352894)&
0.537844*&&&
&&
(.05635)&
1.80701***&&&
1.78542**&&&
(0.000804)&
(0.002896)&
0.302313**&&&
&&
(0.00796)&
0.134306&&&
&&
(0.230737)&
@0.167672**&&& @0.183856**&&&
(0.004645)&
(0.001364)&
@0.175385*&&&
&&
(0.071526)&
82&
81&
0.159247&
0.253541&
&&
&&

&&
II&

&&
III&

&&
IV&

&&
0.48924*&&&
(0.077497)&
1.74675&&&
(0.003255)&
0.299754**&&&
(0.008168)&

&&
0.239718&&&
(0.302115)&
1.69158**&&&
(0.004661)&
0.258372&**&&
(0.019948)&

&&

&&
@0.18993***&&&
(0.000884)&
@0.155302&&&
(0.101633)&
81&
0.256038&
&&

&&
&&
@0.197607***&&& @0.188375***&&&
(.000611)&
(.000907)&

Note:&P(value&in&Parentheses.&*&Denotes&90%&confidence,&**&denotes&95%&confidence,&***denotes&99%&confidence&

&&

&&
1.49479**&&&
(0.007965)&
0.206238**&&&
(0.03566)&

&&
81&
0.238939&

&&

81&
0.238154&
&&
&&
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Table&7:&&Mixed&Lagged&Effects&Regression&Results&
&&
VAR&
CPI&YoY&
M2&YoY&
State&Balance&
Shanghai&Real&Estate&
Investment&
6M&
Industrial&Added&Value&
Observations&
Adjusted&R@squared&
&&

Combined&
I&
0.803014**&&&
(0.008947)&
3.020202***&&&
(1.43E@5)&
@0.238928**&&&
(0.02212)&
0.210609*&&&
(0.061456)&
@0.149759**&&&
(0.013601)&
@0.208518**&&&
(0.038167)&
83&
0.268376&
&&

Individual&
II&
0.213314&&&
(0.340463)&

&&
III&

&&
IV&

&&
V&

&&
VI&

&&
VII&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&
0.915296*&&
(0.058591)&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&
&&
@0.287843**&&&
(0.003512)&
&&
0.216474*&&&
&&
(0.091955)&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&
@0.145185**&&&
(0.016732)&

&&

&&

&&

&&

&&

84&
@0.000972&
&&

86&
0.0142467&
&&

87&
0.085268&
&&

Note:&P(value&in&Parentheses.&*&Denotes&90%&confidence,&**&denotes&95%&confidence,&***denotes&99%&confidence&

87&
0.021671&
&&
&&

&&
@0.070495&&&
(0.467196)&

83&
0.057136&
&&
&&

84&
@0.005651&
&&
&&
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